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Abstract: It is important in biometric person recognition systems to protect personal
data and privacy of users. This paper introduces a new mechanism to revoke and pro-
tect fingerprint minutiae information, which can be used in today’s security-aware so-
ciety. The recently developed minutiae cylinder code (MCC), which provides rotation
and translation invariant descriptors for accurate fingerprint recognition by describing
minutiae neighborhoods with respect to each other, is used as baseline fingerprint de-
scriptor. A hybrid scheme combining a transformation and a user key is designed to
provide the MCC-based fingerprint representation with revocability and irreversibility
properties for template privacy protection across multiple applications. Furthermore,
using the publicly available FVC datasets, it is demonstrated that the designed scheme
improves the baseline accuracy of fingerprint recognition using the MCC method.
1 Introduction
Biometric template privacy protection is gaining importance with the widespread use of
biometric person recognition and an increase in the awareness on related privacy issues.
Biometric template privacy protection should ensure that an individual’s biometric charac-
teristic is only available in the form of a template which is diverse and thus revocable if the
template is compromised. Furthermore, the template must be irreversible to the original
capture and must preserve the accuracy of the underlying recognition system [JNN08].
In the past decade, researchers have proposed various template protection solutions for
different biometric modalities. Template protection techniques can be grouped into two
categories: 1) Feature transformation, which is divided into two sub-categories of a) re-
versible and b) irreversible transformations; 2) Biometric cryptosystems which are cat-
egorized into a) key binding systems and b) key generation systems [JRN11]. Feature
transformation methods apply a transformation function to the biometric representations,
both during enrollment and verification. Comparison is performed in the transformed do-
main. Examples of these methods include the irreversible transformation [RCCB07] and
the biohashing salting methods [TLG04]. Biometric cryptosystems use a biometric char-
acteristic to create a concealing combination of the trait with a cryptographic key or to
generate a cryptographic key from the characteristic. Fuzzy commitment [TAK+05] and
fuzzy vaults [JS02] are pioneering examples of key binding systems and fuzzy extractors
are examples of key generating systems [DRS04]. Hybrid schemes not belonging to any
group, have been investigated as well [BSW07].
In the particular case of the fingerprint modality, several approaches have been proposed
for various representations such as minutiae, ridge information, texture, etc. The minu-
tiae representation is of interest in this paper because of its standardization [ISO05] and
widespread real-world usage [MMJP09]. In one existing template protection scheme, pow-
ers of minutiae coordinates are combined into a hash [TFMG07]. In another, minutiae
triplet characteristics are randomized through binning and permutation [FBTYR07]. Bin-
ning and binarization of minutiae pair characteristics has been proposed as well [ZTTT10].
Another approach consists of quantizing the coordinates of a set of aligned minutiae
[YBBG10]. Minutiae vicinities, which self align, are proposed as well in combination
with a random offset to achieve revocability [YHSB10]. These vicinities are found to be
more robust when decomposed into invariant triplet features, and added a random offset
[ZT11]. Another approach applied to minutiae pairs is the BiotopeTMapproach, which con-
sists of breaking the datum into an invariant part, which is encrypted, and a varying part,
which is left to support approximate matching [BSW07]. A different method consists of
encoding the spatial distribution of minutiae with respect to a reference minutia and to
apply a permutation based on a user key [LK10]. Revocability is obtained by changing
the reference minutia. Another mapping scheme involves a pair-polar transformation in-
cluding a radial random user key [AHW11]. A different mapping consists of transforming
the minutiae in a polar manner with respect to every minutia as reference and quantizing
minutiae attributes to create a bit-string which is then permuted with a user-specific token
[ZTTT11]. This scheme is referred to as polar grid based 3-tuple quantization (PGTQ).
Exploiting the Delaunay triangulation of minutiae in combination with a fuzzy extractor is
also explored [YHW12]. Recently, a specific scheme was designed to provide irreversibil-
ity for the minutiae cylinder code (MCC) representation, which involves the quantization
of the Karhunen-Loeve transform [FMC12]. However, this scheme is not designed to pro-
vide diversity and revocability. Another approach for protecting minutiae maps binarized
histograms of minutiae pair attributes in a many-to-one manner using a randomly gener-
ated matrix in order to provide irreversibility and revocability [WH12]. This scheme is
referred to as the densely infinite-to-one mapping (DITOM). A minimum distance graph
(MDG) scheme is also recently proposed to use distances to the core point as invariant
features in a fingerprint hash [DKG12].
In the present paper, a novel method is proposed to provide template privacy protection
for the minutiae cylinder code (MCC) representation [CFM10], which provides diver-
sity, revocability and irreversibility properties, without degrading the baseline recognition
accuracy. Fingerprint recognition using the MCC representation is chosen because it is
alignment-free and computationally light.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a brief description of
the baseline fingerprint recognition system is provided. In Section 3, the proposed pri-
vacy protection scheme is presented. Experiments to assess performance of the protection
scheme in terms of accuracy are depicted in Section 4, while security aspects are addressed
in Section 4.2. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2 Fingerprint minutiae descriptors based on the minutiae cylinder
code (MCC)
The minutiae cylinder code (MCC) [CFM10] is a recent fingerprint description method,
which presents the advantages of both nearest-neighbor-based and fixed-radius-based minu-
tiae description methods and is considered as the state-of-the-art in minutiae descriptor
design [FZ11].
This method takes as input a set of standard ISO minutiae [ISO05], and creates for each
minutia, a descriptor based on its distance to neighboring minutiae and their angular dif-
ferences. This descriptor is of fixed length, robust to rotations and translations and skin
distortions and is computed in a fast manner. The output consists of a template, which
contains a descriptor for each minutia. This descriptor is a linearized cylinder whose dis-
cretized volume represents weighted spatial and angular distances of each minutiae to its
neighbors. In order to compare two such templates within a recognition system, several
comparison measures were originally introduced. In this paper, the local similarity sort
(LSS) method is chosen among the others because it requires the least extra information
about the original minutiae set when performing cylinder set comparison. The LSS com-
parison method computes all two by two distances of the cylinders and provides a similar-
ity score based on the closest cylinder matches and angular distances of minutiae pairs.
A slightly different version of the MCC method is used in this work. With respect to the
original method, cylinder and cell validities are not considered and the weighting func-
tions used to compute the spatial and angular contributions of neighboring minutiae are
discretized.
3 A privacy protection scheme for the MCC templates
According to template privacy protection requirements, it is desirable to create from a raw
biometric sample, several diverse and revocable templates which are irreversible to the
original biometric characteristic and support accurate recognition. The baseline accuracy
corresponds to recognition without template protection. It is thus required that template
protection does not degrade this accuracy. Revocability is achieved when including a revo-
cable component into the template, as original biometric characteristics are not revocable.
Therefore, the privacy protection scheme presented in this paper is a hybrid two-factor
scheme which transforms the template with a user key in a revocable and non-reversible
manner. The key is assumed secret in the baseline protected system, but it is shown that
even if the key is compromised or lost, the original biometric characteristic remains pro-
tected. The proposed solution takes root from cryptographic primitives such as the hard
problem of square root modulo a composite number [HPS08]. During the modulo op-
eration the quotient is dismissed, it is impossible to reconstruct accurately the original
value. Also, as in filtering techniques, e.g., mean filtering, where the underlying operation
replaces one value by a value inferred from several original values, the output is more ho-
mogeneous with respect to the input and removes small variations such as noise. For this
reason, the transformation presented here includes a step in which two original values are
added to each other. The reduced intra-class variations are a positive step in working with
biometric data, which suffer from inherent variations.
The output of the MCC descriptor creation is a template T for every fingerprint, which
contains a fixed length descriptor, referred to as cylinder TC, for each minutia. In order to
dismantle the original structure of the cylinders, two-by-two elements are summed based
on a user key, which is a permutation of the cylinder indexes. The remainder of the divi-
sion of the square of this sum by a given parameter is then considered as a new revocable
value as summarized in Equation 1. A binarization step is performed on the transformed
values to introduce irreversibilty and quantization, which is necessary in presence of the
intrinsic intra-class variations of biometric data. Because of the small values of the base-
line MCC template, a multiplication factor A is used to adapt the size of the argument. A
user key k, which is a random permutation of the cylinder indexes, is employed to specify
the order of the summations of two-by-two elements. Changing this key ensures that it
is possible to create several diverse instances of one biometric characteristic and allows
to implement revocability through key managment. The revocable template, which is the
output of the method presented in this paper, is denoted byRT and its cylinders asRTCs.
The parameters of the protection operation include the multiplication factor A, the user
key k and the divisor n.
RTC[i] = B((A(TC[k(2i− 1)] + TC[k(2i)]))2 mod n)
for i = 1, ..., nbelements(TC)/2, and ∀TC ∈ T, (1)
where B(v) binarizes each element of the descriptor by means of a threshold:
B(v) =
{
1, if v > t
0, if v ≤ t. (2)
The values of A and n must be in accordance with each other in order for the modulo
operation to be meaningful and although they are presented as two different parameters,
they are dependent on each other. It is observed that max(TC[k(i)] +TC[k(i+ 1)]) = 2,
because the output of the MCC method yields descriptors whose values are normalized
between 0 and 1. In order for the modulo operation to yield meaningful results, A and n
must be chosen such that n < (2A)2. Furthermore, if the argument (i.e., (2A)2) is very
large compared to the divisor n, the discriminatory power of the biometric information is
lost. Empirically, it is observed that the argument must not be more than three orders of
magnitude larger than the divisor, i.e., n < (2A)2 < 103n. The threshold t is determined
based on the values of the transformed descriptors (which in turn depend on A and n) and
is empirically fine-tuned.
Given that the same transformation is applied on every cylinder in the template, it is possi-
ble to use the original LSS comparison measure of the MCC method [CFM10] . The LSS
matching is based on computing the Euclidean distance of two by two cylinders. Given
that by using the same key, the elements of the cylinders are shuffled in the same man-
ner, their element by element distance does not vary. Due to the properties of Euclidean
spaces and the nature of the transformation in Equation 1, a correlation exists between the
distance of two descriptors before and after the transformation. This correlation is later
observed in the obtained results.
The transformation presented in this article, is evaluated in three aspects: accuracy, revo-
cability and irreversibility. The accuracy of the recognition system with the transformation
must not be lower than that of the recognition system without the transformation. It must
be possible to generate several instances of one MCC template which are unlinkable and
thus diverse and revocable. Finally, it must not be possible to accurately derive the orig-
inal biometric trait from the transformed template, even when all parameters are known.
In this case, it must not be possible to re-create the MCC descriptor, and thus the minutiae
information from a transformed template.
4 Experiments, performance results and discussion
In order to evaluate the proposed privacy protection scheme, the public and widely used
FVC2002 [MMC+02] and 2004 [MMC+04] databases are used, which contain each, 8
impressions from 100 fingers. The minutiae of every fingerprint, formatted according to
the ISO standard [ISO05], are extracted using the open source FingerJetFXOSE software
by DigitalPersona [dig].
The original FVC protocol is used to generate genuine and impostor scores. Each template
is compared against the remaining templates of the same finger to generate genuine scores
and the first template of each finger is compared with the first template of all other fingers
to generate impostor scores.
The MCC algorithm is implemented according to Section 2 and is hereafter referred to as
the ”baseline MCC”. The MCC double-valued cylinder creation and matching parameters
are ns = 16, nd = 8, R = 75, σs = 6, µψ = 0.005, σD = 0.4363, minV C = 20,
minM = 1, minME = 20%, minnp = 3, maxnp = 10, µP = 10, τP = 0.4 and
∆Θ = 2.35. The size of each descriptor in the template using these parameters is 2048
elements. The minutiae extractor is modified to allow template creation for images with
any number of minutiae.
4.1 Accuracy of the transformed templates
In order to assess accuracy changes after applying the template privacy protection method
introduced in this paper, the genuine and impostor distributions are displayed in Figure 1
for the two cases of recognition using the baseline MCC templates and recognition using
the protected MCC templates on the FVC2002 DB1 in the case where each identity is
assigned a different key. On the corresponding detection error trade-off (DET) curves
in Figure 2, it can be observed that recognition using protected MCC templates yields
better overall separation and lower false accept rates (FAR) and false rejection rates (FRR)
than recognition using the baseline MCC templates. Consequently, the equal error rate
(EER) (the operating point at which FAR = FRR) is lowered as well. Corresponding error
rates are reported in Table 1 for three operating points (EER point, the 1% FAR point and
the 0.1% FAR point), as well as genuine/impostor class separation computed using the
characteristics of Gaussian curves fitted to the actual distributions [MR05]. The EERs for
the FVC2002 and 2004 databases (unseen data) are reported in Table 3. The parameters A
and n (Equation 1) are set to 5×103 and 106 respectively in order for the modulo operation
to be meaningful while preserving the discriminatory power of the biometric information.
Furthermore, in order to verify the validity of the conditions given for the values of A and
n with respect to each other, several combinations were empirically chosen and tested.
It must be noted that for variations smaller than an order of magnitude in the values of
A and n, the performance results vary marginally and in a negligible way with respect
to the size of the databases used in this study. It can be observed that if A is too large
compared to n, the recognition results are considerably lowered, which means that too
much discriminative information is lost. Cases whereA is too small compared to n are not
considered, as the modulo operation becomes meaningless in these ranges. The threshold
t is set to 105. However, this value is not optimal and other values within the range of n
are empirically tested in Table 2.
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Figure 1: Genuine and impostor distributions for the cases of recognition using the baseline MCC
templates and the transformed MCC templates. FVC2002 DB1 images.
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Figure 2: DET curves for recognition using the baseline MCC templates and the transformed MCC
templates. FVC2002 DB1 images.
Although the values of the template as well as the chosen transformation parametersA and
n are too small to qualify in the typical hard problem in cryptography of finding a square
root modulo a composite, it can be observed that results of applying the transformation
in Equation 1 are quite interesting with respect to the particular issues of template protec-
tion. From the results presented in Figures 1 and 2, it can be concluded that the protection
scheme presented in this paper improves the overall verification performance. This obser-
vation is made through the lowered error rates as well as an increased genuine/impostor
class separation. This phenomenon is explained by the two-factor authentication. The user
key provides extra discriminative information to the templates. It must be noted that ex-
periments further in this paper (Section 4.2) show that by setting all keys to one unique and
Method EER FRR@FAR
1%
FRR@FAR
0.1%
Class sep-
aration
Baseline MCC 1.21% 1.21% 2.25% 0.89
Protected MCC 0.72% 0.67% 1.39% 1.43
Table 1: Recognition results. FVC2002 DB1 images.
Threshold t 105 2× 105 4× 105 6× 105 8× 105
EER 0.72% 0.65% 0.49% 0.28% 0.36%
Table 2: Recognition results for different values of the binarization threshold t. FVC2002 DB1
images.
universal key, it is the biometric information being recognized and not the key. Another
positive aspect of this privacy protection scheme is that the transformation reduces the size
of the template by half. This property is beneficial when considering large databases as
well as applications with reduced resources such as smart cards.
The proposed method is presented along side other state-of-the-art methods in fingerprint
minutiae template protection with published results in Table 4. It must be noted that a
fair comparison is near impossible since not all methods use the same data and the same
testing protocol. Methods such as presented in [YBBG10, ZTTT10] use several enroll-
ment samples. Methods such as in [ZT11] explicitly do not use the FVC testing protocol.
Furthermore, different minutiae extractors are used by different researchers which may
introduce non-negligible differences in the final performance absolute values. It is impor-
tant to avoid binary comparisons and instead, to consider various methods with respect to
each other based on both their positive and negative aspects with respect to a particular
application.
4.2 Diversity and revocability of transformed templates
In targeted working conditions of the biometric recognition system, where the protection
scheme is implemented and working in its normal mode, each user has his own key. This
key is first used to enroll (enr) his template in the database and is later reused to reproduce
the transformation during verification (ver). The operating point decision thresholds are
determined in this scenario, which is referred to as same key enr/ver.
If a template is revoked, the corresponding key is black-listed and a new template is gen-
erated using a different key. The two templates must be different in order for the old
template to be nullified. This scenario is referred to as different key enr/ver and corre-
sponds to the case where a user needs several different instances of his biometric for use
in different applications. Given that the original template consists of descriptors with
m = nbelements(TC) elements (m = 2048 in this paper), m! different keys can be gener-
ated. However, since the two elements of TC specified by k are added to each other before
undergoing any other operations, the order of the elements does not matter. For example,
if nbelements(TC) = 8, then keys k1 = 37814256 and k2 = 73814256 yield the same
protected template. They are equivalent to all other keys which have the same indices in
the consecutive odd and even positions, regardless of the order of the indices within the
FVC2002 FVC2004
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
Baseline MCC 1.21% 1.15% 6.45% 5.35% 6.19% 10.06% 7.00% 7.96%
Protected MCC 0.72% 0.42% 3.84% 1.39% 1.95% 6.78% 1.35% 2.36%
Table 3: Recognition results for the FVC 2002 and 2004 databases.
pair. A “pair” here refers to an odd and even position in the key, for example k[1] and k[2]
are a pair, as well as k[3] and k[4]. If k has m elements, then there are m2 pairs. There are
2m/2 possible permutations within the pairs since every pair has two permutations. The
2m/2 permutations yield equivalent keys as only the position within a pair varies from one
key to another, not affecting the outcome of the transformation. These 2m/2 keys are a
category of equivalent keys. Therefore in order to compute the number of distinct keys
(which yield different protected templates through the transformation), the total number
of permutations must be divided by the number of categories of equivalent keys, which re-
sults in m!
2m/2
different keys. In order to ensure two diverse templates of one person are not
similar, the pseudo-impostor accept rate (PIAR) is introduced to evaluate the proportion of
successful pseudo-impostor attempts. A pseudo-impostor comparison is the comparison
of two templates of one individual, which are generated using two distinct keys. It can
be seen in Table 5 and Figure 3, that it is difficult to use a template generated with the
wrong key for positive verification. If a user loses his key, it is known by an adversary.
This scenario is simulated by using the same key for enrollment and verification, for all
users, and is referred to as the stolen-token scenario. Furthermore, this scenario shows that
it is the biometric information being verified, and not the key. These diversity and security
testing scenarios are implemented according to [WH12].
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Figure 3: Genuine, impostor and pseudo-impostor distributions (in the different key enr./ver. scenario
to evaluate diversity). FVC2002 DB1 images.
It can be concluded from the observations in Table 5, that it is possible to define an op-
erating point for the privacy protection scheme presented in this paper, such that, a very
limited number of impostors (and pseudo-impostors) gain access to the system with an
unauthorized key. It must be noted that the security of this scheme is dependent on the
decision threshold and offers flexibility in various operational scenarios.
Scheme EER Database + -
biotope [BSW07] 2.9% FVC2000 DB1, 2;
FVC2002 DB1, 2;
FVC2004 DB1, 2
no alignment, revo-
cable, no decrease
in performance
security depends on
encryption (secrecy
of key)
minutiae hash
[TFMG07]
3% FVC2002 DB1 no alignment, revo-
cable
secrecy of key
needed, decrease in
performance
triangulation, bin-
ning and random-
ization [FBTYR07]
0 1000 fingerprints, 2
samples
revocable security based on
crypto. encryption
or hash
pairs, binning and
randomization
[ZTTT10]
0 FVC2004 DB1 revocable 5 samples/ enr.;
pseudo-irreversible,
security depends on
secrecy of the key
robust minutiae
hash [YBBG10]
2.23% FVC2002 DB2 revocable 2 samples/ enr.
minutiae vicinity
[YHSB10]
2.6% FVC2002 DB2 revocable, public
parameters
alignment, depen-
dence of template
size on security
mapping and per-
mutation [LK10]
0 FVC2004 DB1, 2, 3 no alignment pseudo-irreversible,
limited instances
minutiae vicinity de-
composition [ZT11]
0 FVC2002 DB2 no alignment 2 out of 8 sam-
ples removed from
dataset, pseudo-
irreversible
delaunay triangula-
tion and fuzzy ex-
tractor [YHW12]
13% FVC2002 DB2 no alignment not revocable
pair-polar mapping
[AHW11]
6% (stolen token) FVC2002 DB1, 2, 3 no alignment, revo-
cable
decreases baseline
performance
irreversible MCC
[FMC12]
0 FVC2002
DB1,2,3,4;
FVC2006 DB2
no alignment not revocable
DITOM [WH12] 3.5% (stolen token) FVC2002 DB1, 2, 3
(2 images per fin-
ger)
no alignment, revo-
cable
decreases baseline
performance
PGTQ [ZTTT11] 1.19% (stolen to-
ken)
FVC2002 DB1, 2 revocable unproven security
MDG [DKG12] 4% (stolen token) FVC2002 DB1, 2 no alignment, revo-
cable
core point detection
Method proposed in
this paper
0.28% FVC2002 DB1,
2, 3, 4; FVC2004
DB1, 2, 3, 4
no alignment, no
decrease in per-
formance, reduced
(fix) template size
decrease in perfor-
mance when key is
public
Table 4: Comparison of state-of-the-art fingerprint minutiae template protection schemes.
Threshold same key enr./ver. different key enr./ver. stolen token
FAR FRR FAR PIAR FAR FRR
0.4489 1% 0.67% 1.03% 5.1% 41.57% 0.75%
0.4518 0.72% 0.72% 0.66% 3.32% 35.91% 0.78%
0.4673 0.1% 1.39% 0.06% 0.57% 13.37% 1.2%
0.4710 0.04% 1.6% 0.06% 0.46% 0.24% 2.53%
0.4934 0 2.71% 0 0 1.01% 2.82%
Table 5: Error rates at different operating points under different diversity and security assumptions.
FVC2002 DB1 images.
4.3 Irreversibility of the transformed templates
In order to effectively protect a person’s biometric characteristic, it must not be possible
to deduce said characteristic from the transformed template, even when all parameters, in-
cluding the key, are known. In the transformation presented in this paper, non-reversibility
is provided by the fact that during the transformation in Equation 1, part of the data is
discarded through the modulo and quantization, which does not allow exact reconstruc-
tion even if all parameters are known. However, it is possible to create an approximation
of a binary MCC template given a transformed template and the corresponding key as
described in Equation 3:
TCR[k(2i)] =
{
1, if RTC[i] = 1
0, otherwise and
TCR[k(2i+ 1)] =
{
1, if RTC[i] = 1
0, otherwise.
i = 1, ..., nbelements(RTC), and ∀RTC ∈ RT. (3)
TCR denotes the approximated MCC templates and is compared to the baseline binary
MCC template, for all users of a database in Figure 4. It can be seen and concluded that
these approximated templates do not resemble the baseline MCC templates and thus can-
not be systematically used to extract useful minutiae information. In fact, when compared
with genuine templates, the reconstructed templates are similar to impostor templates.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, a novel template privacy protection technique for the MCC representation
of fingerprint minutiae templates was presented. The proposed hybrid, two-factor tech-
nique combining a transformation and a user key, provides diversity, revocability, and irre-
versibility for the MCC descriptors with respect to the original minutiae information while
improving the accuracy in recognition. Furthermore, the proposed technique reduces the
template size by half.
Future work will include study and modification of the transformation in order to extend
of the ideas presented in this paper to other modalities than fingerprints.
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Figure 4: Genuine, impostor and pseudo-impostor distributions (approximated MCC templates to
evaluate non-reversibility). FVC2002 DB1 images.
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